Not Before Time: UK Defence Funding Uplift

Whether it was the desire to have something tangible to offer the US President or a considered awakening to new realities in the east as well as to the west, PM Keir Starmer brought forward the commitment to increase defence spending from 2% to 2.5% to April 2027 from the previous ‘ambition’ to reach this level by 2030, potentially an extra £13 billion a year post-2027. The new ‘ambition’, incidentally is to reach 3% by 2030.

While this has generated much excitement as well as a dramatic boost to defence firms’ share prices (for example, defence technology expert QinetiQ has jumped 40% in a month), it should first be noted that while demand for defence equipment remains undoubtedly strong given the current security environment, this additional spend won’t actually come on stream for 2 years.

Strategic Defence Review Imminent

Secondly, with the publication of the Strategic Defence Review imminent, the details of where the new cash might be spent can only be provisional. However, given the situation in Ukraine, within NATO and the obvious priorities of the new US administration it is highly likely that the former emphasis on security and competition in the Asia-Pacific theatre is to be significantly softened if not jettisoned entirely. It is also the case that the three external reviewers appointed by the government to lead the SDR are Lord Robertson, Dr Fiona Hill and General Sir Richard Barrons, all of whom in terms of their relevant experience and expertise (which is extensive) focussed on NATO and the Russian threat, with varying degrees of hawkishness as far as Russia and Putin are concerned.

In which case, there are a number of very good reasons to believe that the areas of investment will be driven by the experience of the Ukraine war and the threat to NATO’s eastern flank posed by Russia. When assessing the threat from Russia, it has been the norm for western commentators and experts to somewhat exaggerate the capabilities of the Russian armed forces, although it is perhaps more difficult to argue that, given the invasion of Ukraine and subsequent calamitous war, Russia’s ambitions have been overstated, although that should not be discounted as a possibility.

Balanced Deterrence

Nevertheless, it is the case that not only did the informed commentariat dramatically overestimate Russian military effectiveness at the start of the Ukraine war but that this has been the case throughout the Cold War as well as in the case of Russia’s other military adventures since the fall of the Berlin Wall (Afghanistan, Chechnya I/II etc.). The point here is not to discuss why this might be a consistent pattern but to point out that it is generally the case that Russian military power is significantly less of a threat than is imagined. The Ukraine war especially in its early stages but even so in its current virtual stalemate has born this out.

Thus, there is a legitimate question mark over just how far the UK’s armed forces (and indeed the rest of NATO) should reorientate itself in terms of the Russian threat. When your likely adversary can only move forward after incurring horrendous casualties, is bringing armoured vehicles to the front line that have been in storage since the 1960s, is incapable of air sorties of more than 2 combat aircraft at a time or is unable to mount coordinated infantry assaults above platoon level, whatever the very real threat posed to Ukrainian forces, this is not the kind of force, however large, that can compete with NATO forces in a straight fight. It is the case that were there to be a direct conflict between NATO and Russian forces, a very real problem for NATO would be to limit the damage to Russian forces so as not to precipitate a resort to tactical nuclear weapons by the Russians as their cohesion collapses both at the front and potentially at home also.

Prepare to Win

There are two caveats to the above scenario. Firstly, deterrence of Russia is not the same as fighting Russia. Russia knows the capabilities of the West; it is unlikely after the catastrophic miscalculation of the “Special Military Operation” that Russia would contemplate overt aggression against a NATO member country. What Russia has a very low estimation of is the West’s will to confront, something that has considerable justification. But the determination to match Russia’s conventional power as deterrence is as much as sign of will and resilience as anything else. Defence spending increases and matching the threat posed by Russian capabilities is necessary as a signal designed in the long-term to keep the lid on Russian ambitions and adventurism. It may well be that tensions and friction will arise but it is more likely to be below the level of overt military action should it happen at all.

The second caveat is that, in the event of a direct conflict with Russia, NATO must have adequate stocks of munitions otherwise its superiority in equipment and expertise will count for little after the initial phase of a conflict. NATO, certainly in the air, has the platforms to inflict the kind of pain that even the resilience of the Russian war machine would find hard to withstand. However, if NATO were to run short of missiles, ammunition etc. the outcome would be very much in doubt. And this brings us to the issue of where the extra money earmarked by the UK and other European countries is likely to be spent, at least initially. The following are, I suggest, the key areas of investment that require resource in the land domain: munitions, metal, missile defence and CEMA (Cyber and Electro-Magnetic Effects).

1. Munitions: Munitions stockpiles in the UK have been somewhat neglected over the past 20 years, understandably so as a result of the kind of low-intensity, counter-insurgency warfare the UK military has been engaged in in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and elsewhere. Such stocks as there were have been significantly depleted as a result of sending supplies to Ukraine over the past three years. Stocks of artillery shells but perhaps most importantly various air-to-ground bombs and missiles are very low. Furthermore, new inventories of more specialised munitions such as those designed to suppress the air defences and radar that make up an integrated air defence system will be essential if NATO is to win command of the air against Russia, especially if US involvement is diminished or absent. Domestically produced options exist such as the Spear 3 missile variants but stock levels will need to be higher than has become the norm since the 1990s. This also includes stocks of Storm Shadow long-range strike missiles that have been so effective against Russian forces.

The other aspect of adequate munitions stocks is the ability to surge supply in the event of open conflict such that front line ground and air forces are adequately supplied with the ordnance required to defeat an enemy that will, whatever else, deploy on a very large scale. Some progress has been made here with the government providing money to increase the munitions manufacturing facilities of BAE Systems in Washington and Glascoed. Nevertheless, expect specific mention to be made in the SDR of the importance of further investment required to ensure supply in the event of a conflict.

2. Metal: The UK does not need to match Russia in terms of quantity of armoured vehicles or artillery as the capability of UK equipment is very much superior and has been proved as such in the limited exposure of UK equipment in the hands of the Ukrainian armed forces in the current conflict. However, as a Russian once said, “Quantity has a quality all of its own.” UK armoured vehicle fleets and artillery systems need firstly to be replenished and secondly increased. They need to be replenished because current inventories are very low following supply to Ukraine.[1] Challenger IIs are 20 vehicles short, Warrior IFVs 20% below strength and even the venerable FV 430s 17% understrength. In artillery, there are large gaps in AS 90 SPGs (56% lower) and, although there is a replacement on order (Archer) these are the UK’s only 155mm artillery, a type that has been prominent in the Ukraine conflict. But not only do stocks need to be replaced, an expansion of capability is required to present a competitive deterrent fit for the next 20 years or more.
3. Missile Defence: NATO has an overwhelming advantage in its air power compared to the Russian VKS. Not only are the alliance’s combat aircraft more capable so is the level of training and expertise of their pilots (critical in the decisive use of their superior technology) but operationally also NATO trains for and is capable of conducting integrated offensive air campaigns in a way that Russia appears incapable of. NATO’s clear advantage is based on air superiority and as such, the alliance, including the UK, should move to ensure this remains the case throughout a potentially protracted campaign. This would involve, in particular, capabilities to suppress Russian surface to air capabilities that act as an umbrella of air defence for their forces in the absence of a truly effective airforce. UK and other NATO members need to revitalise their ability to engage S-400 and S-500 missile batteries and their associated radar with aircraft armed with SEAD/DEAD[2] munitions delivered from combat aircraft with pilots specifically trained for this type of mission.

In addition, NATO’s own air defence needs to be upgraded to be able to deal with the threat of Russia’s latest hypersonic missiles and other long range strike options. This would take the form of systems similar to the Patriot or Aster SAMT/P air defence systems.

4. CEMA: One of the most discussed aspects of the Ukraine war has been the saturation of the battlefield with a wide variety of autonomous systems and munitions. The importance in the current conflict of these systems is partly driven by the static nature of the fight and the importance of artillery. While the UK would hope that a conflict between Russia and NATO would be possibly more fluid and one in which NATO would dominate the air. In this case perhaps autonomous systems would not be as important. However, it is undoubtedly the case that autonomous systems of all kinds will be more ubiquitous and also that land forces need to take seriously the threat posed by these systems both in terms of reconnaissance to guide artillery targeting but also direct strikes on vehicles and personnel.

The key to this will be a variety of systems that will enable effective counter-UAS and more broadly to dominate the electro-magnetic spectrum, otherwise known as electronic warfare (EW). This is currently strong in certain areas and negligible in others. An integrated and networked system of a variety EW systems and intelligence at all levels of the land force from platoon up to brigade level will be required. This will mean additional procurement of systems but also significant investment in training and coordination.[3]

Slow Burn, Consistent Heat

None of the above areas for investment will come about overnight. As one commentator has noted, “You can’t just order a new army for delivery on Amazon Prime.”[4] Building these capabilities and procuring new equipment will take several years. Some of this is already underway and the SDR will give the direction of travel further focus, despite the increase in the overall budget not actually coming through for another two years. However, what is now certain is that the key areas of spend will almost certainly include the segments discussed briefly above and that the uplift in defence spending will be significant as well as sustained for a considerable period of time.

[1] The following numbers are taken from the 2024 edition of the MoDs “UK Armed Forces Equipment and Formations” and ‘understrength’ is a comparison of current inventories with 2016 levels (arguably in themselves ‘understrength’ even in 2016). www.gov.uk/government/statistics/uk-armed-forces-equipment-and-formations-2024

[2] Suppression of Air Defences (SEAD) & Destruction of Air Defences (DEAD)

[3] The British Army in fairness have already taken steps along these lines by standing up the CEMA Effects Group in 2024, bringing together the three regiments in the Royal Signals dedicated to EW and cyber warfare.

[4] Prof. Mark Galeotti, In Moscow’s Shadows No. 189 (podcast), 2^nd. March 2025